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Introduction
The recent …nancial crisis has refocused attention on the general importance, impact and measurement of banks'insolvency and liquidity risk. A popular risk measure in the banking and …nancial stability related literature that re ‡ects a bank's probability of insolvency is the Z-score. 1 Its widespread use 2 is due to its relative simplicity and the fact that it can be calculated using only accounting information; this, in contrast to market-based risk measures, makes it also applicable to the substantial number of unlisted …nancial institutions. 3 In its general form, allowing for non-normal return distributions, it is generally attributed to Hannan and Hanweck (1988) and Boyd et al. (1993) ; Boyd and Graham (1986) had previously introduced Z-scores in the special context of normal return distributions.
In this paper, we re-examine the probabilistic foundation of this general approach to proxying a bank's probability of insolvency, demonstrating that it is in fact possible to re…ne,
i.e. improve on, the measure of the probability of insolvency implied by this traditional approach without imposing any further distributional assumptions. We show that while the traditional measure of the probability of insolvency thus provides a less e¤ective upper bound of the probability of insolvency, it can in fact be meaningfully reinterpreted as a measure capturing the odds of insolvency instead. 4 We then further show that this re…nement of the probabilistic foundation of Z-score measures implies that the risk measures commonly used in the existing literature, such as the simple Z-score or its log-transformation, are also more closely related to the odds of insolvency than the probability of insolvency itself. As a consequence, the log of the Z-score in particular emerges from our re…nement as an insolvency risk measure that is attractive and unproblematic to use (even as a dependent variable in standard regression analysis), providing more rigorously founded support to its emerging use in the literature.
Section 2 now reviews the traditional probabilistic interpretation of Z-scores, introduces our re…nement, and advances related risk measures re ‡ecting the odds of insolvency; Section 3 discusses some implications of our results for applied work; and Section 4 concludes the paper.
Z-score measures: a re…ned probabilistic interpretation
Let us …rst recapitulate the traditional justi…cation for using Z-scores as a risk measure re ‡ecting a bank's probability of insolvency. In line with most of the existing literature, 5 we de…ne bank insolvency as a state where (car + roa) 0, with car the bank's capital-asset ratio and roa its return on assets. Hannan and Hanweck (1988) and Boyd et al. (1993) then pointed out that if roa is a random variable with …nite mean roa and variance 2 roa , the Chebyshev inequality allows one to state an upper bound of the probability of insolvency as
where the Z-score is de…ned as Z car+ roa roa > 0; we could refer to the measure Z 2 as the traditional insolvency probability bound.
7 5 Some authors, e.g. Barry et al. (2011) and Bouvatier et al. (2014) , consider an alternative return-on-equity based Z-score measure as …rst proposed in Goyeau and Tarazi (1992) ; we derive an analogous re…ned probabilistic interpretation of such a measure in Appendix B.
6 As similarly implemented by Roy (1952) , this is an application of the (two-sided) Chebyshev inequality (see Ross, 1997, p. 396) : it states that for a random variable X with …nite mean and variance 2 , it holds for any k > 0 that P fjX j kg 2 =k 2 . 7 Hannan and Hanweck (1988) used this traditional insolvency probability bound as their proxy of a bank's probability of insolvency (under the additional assumption of symmetry). However, much of the remaining empirical literature has followed Boyd and Graham (1986) and Boyd et al. (1993) by using the simple Z-scores Z as the relevant bank insolvency risk measure instead; as such it is Equation (1) gives a probabilistic interpretation of Z-scores as a particular non-linear transformation of a bank's probability of insolvency; this could have implications for the correct formulation of empirical models and hypotheses and the meaningful discussion of results. In this context it is therefore important to point out that it is in fact possible to improve on the traditional insolvency probability bound given by Equation (1) 
where the Z-score Z is de…ned as Z
Proof. See the Appendix.
We could refer to the measure (1 + Z 2 ) 1 characterized by Equation (2) as the improved insolvency probability bound; it is straightforward to see that it is consistently tighter than the traditional insolvency probability bound given by Equation (1), and is also naturally bounded below one. 9 In particular, we can state Corollary 1. The traditional insolvency probability bound provides a less e¤ective upper bound of the probability of insolvency than the improved measure given in Proposition 1; the di¤erence between the traditional and improved measures D (Z) has a maximum value of 0:5
being widely used in cross-sectional, but increasingly also in panel studies (see Lepetit and Strobel 2013) . [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] Proof. See the Appendix.
We thus observe that the lack of e¤ectiveness in the proxying of a bank's probability of insolvency encountered when relying on traditional insolvency probability bounds is particularly large in the region that is arguably the most relevant in this context, i.e. for banks with relatively low Z-scores and thus at signi…cant risk of becoming insolvent. This is illustrated in Figure 1 , which also shows that the di¤erence between the traditional and improved measures does get (fairly rapidly) smaller the larger the Z-score, and thus the more remote the chance of the bank becoming insolvent. The practical relevance of this lack of e¤ectiveness when relying on traditional insolvency probability bounds will be illustrated further using real data in Section 3.1.
Rather intriguingly, we can further note Corollary 2. The traditional insolvency probability bound satis…es Z
it gives an upper bound of the odds of insolvency.
Proof. This follows from rearranging equation (2).
While the traditional insolvency probability bound gives a less e¤ective upper bound of the probability of insolvency based on our re…nement, it does in fact provide an upper bound of the odds of insolvency, a closely related risk measure; we could thus, more appropriately, refer to the measure Z 2 as the insolvency odds bound. 10 Furthermore, our results also imply a re…ned probabilistic interpretation of the more commonly used simple Z-scores Z as such, as stated in the following Corollary 3. The Z-score satis…es Z p(roa car) 1 p(roa car) 1 2 , i.e. it gives a lower bound of the inverse square root of the odds of insolvency.
Consequently, the log of the Z-score satis…es ln
2 ln (Z), i.e. it is negatively proportional to an upper bound of the log odds 11 of insolvency.
Proof. This follows from Corollary 2.
Amongst these alternative, if intrinsically related insolvency risk measures, the Z-score or its log-transformation are in widespread use in the empirical literature, whereas the improved insolvency probability bound and the (reinterpreted) insolvency odds bound do not seem to be commonly used so far. Notwithstanding any such implementation decision, the particular probabilistic interpretations of the di¤erent insolvency risk measures discussed might prove useful when formulating empirical models and hypotheses and discussing results more generally.
Further implications

Economic signi…cance
We now illustrate that the lack of e¤ectiveness arising (in line with Corollary 1) when a bank's probability of insolvency is proxied using traditional insolvency probability bounds is of practical relevance in real data. For this, we calculate Z-scores, traditional and improved insolvency probability bounds, and, in the …rst instance, the resulting (relative) di¤erence between the traditional and improved measures using a dataset of OECD commercial, cooperative and savings banks, extracted from BvD Bankscope and covering the period 1998-2012.
12
We note from Table 1 that the average relative di¤erence between the traditional and improved measures for our OECD sample is 0.991%, being highest for commercial banks at 1.123% overall; it is particularly high for EU15 commercial banks at 3.348% and US cooperative and savings banks at 1.305% and 1.342%, respectively. However, for the banks with the lowest 10% of Z-scores, i.e. banks with a more pronounced risk of becoming insolvent, we can see from Table 2 that the average relative di¤erence between the traditional and improved measures rises substantially to 7.509% for the OECD sample and is now highest for cooperative banks at 8.834% overall; it is particularly high for EU15 commercial banks at 16.630% and US savings banks at 8.770% in this case. Lastly, we can also observe from Table   3 that, as expected, the average relative di¤erence between the traditional and improved measures has gone up throughout when comparing these measures for the pre-crisis (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) and crisis (2007-2009) periods, respectively.
As a complementary way of highlighting the economic signi…cance of the di¤erence between the traditional and improved measures, we can further ask what hypothetical equity bu¤ers (i.e. di¤erentials) would lead the traditional and improved measures to be identical for a given bank. 13 We see from Table 1 that the average relative hypothetical capital ratio bu¤er (or alternatively, average absolute hypothetical equity bu¤er) equating the traditional and improved measures for our OECD sample is 0.947% ($2.391m) and is highest for commercial banks at 1.116% ($3.068m) overall; it is particularly high for EU15 commercial banks at 6.775% ($25.198m) and US savings banks at 1.409% (US cooperative banks at $51.977m).
For the banks with the lowest 10% of Z-scores, Table 2 shows that the corresponding average relative hypothetical capital ratio bu¤er (average absolute hypothetical equity bu¤er) rises substantially to 8.189% ($17.679m) for the OECD sample and is now highest for savings banks at 9.174% (commercial banks at $19.338m) overall; it is particularly high for EU15 commercial banks at 36.340% ($113.507m) and US savings banks at 10.156% (US cooperative banks at $206.061m) in this case.
Overall, while one could argue that the traditional insolvency probability bound gives a "conservative" measure of a bank's probability of insolvency as viewed from a regulator's perspective, the improved insolvency probability bound is clearly the more appropriate measure in the sense of being more e¤ective to an economically signi…cant degree, particularly for banks with higher levels of insolvency risk, and should thus be preferred.
Forecasting performance
In addition to the e¤ectiveness issue outlined above, it is interesting to look at some forecasting properties of the traditional as compared with the improved insolvency probability bound measure. We focus on the recent …nancial crisis to highlight this issue, examining how well those two measures calculated over a pre-crisis sample (covering the years [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] were able to forecast the corresponding realized ones calculated over the crisis period (de…ned as the years 2007-2009). In order to assess forecasting performance in this context, we use the coe¢ cient of variation of the root mean squared error (CV(RMSE)), calculated for both satis…es (1 + Z 2 h ) 1 = Z 2 for Z 1 and (1 + Z 2 h ) 1 = 1 for Z < 1; this gives car h = roa + roa p Z 2 1 for Z 1 and car h = roa for Z < 1. Relative hypothetical capital ratio bu¤ers are then de…ned as car=car h 1, and absolute hypothetical equity bu¤ers as (car car h )TA, with total assets TA. the traditional and improved probability bound measures pb as
where the n banks are indexed by i. The results are given in Table 3 : we observe that the coe¢ cient of variation of the RMSE is consistently lower when using the improved insolvency probability bound measures compared with using the traditional ones, irrespective of country grouping or bank type. Therefore, the improved insolvency probability bound is the more accurate measure also in this forecasting context, and should thus be preferred over the traditional one.
Log of Z-score
From a practical implementation point of view, Laeven and Levine (2009) and Houston et al. (2010) advocate the use of the log of the Z-score over the simple Z-score on the basis that the latter's distribution is heavily skewed, whereas the former's is not. Figure 2 con…rms this observation for our dataset of OECD commercial, cooperative and savings banks, showing also that both the traditional and the improved insolvency probability bounds have distributions with degrees of skewness even higher than those of the simple Z-scores.
14 On a related note, it is instructive to examine the respective ranges of the di¤erent insolvency risk measures considered in this context. The improved insolvency probability bound lies in the interval [0; 1), while the insolvency odds bound and thus, from Corollary 3, the Z-score are meaningfully de…ned on the interval [0; 1); these might thus require the use of limited dependent variable techniques when the insolvency risk measures are used as dependent variables in relevant empirical analysis. The log of the Z-score, on the other hand, has a meaningful probabilistic interpretation on the interval ( 1; 1), i.e. the domain of all real numbers, as a consequence of our re…nement.
Overall this makes the log of the Z-score an unproblematic insolvency risk measure to use in standard regression analysis, both as dependent and independent variable; clearly, this would lend support to its emerging use in the literature, albeit with a now more solidly founded probabilistic interpretation as a risk measure that is negatively proportional to a bank's log odds of insolvency.
Conclusion
We re-examine the probabilistic foundation of the traditional link between Z-score measures and banks'probability of insolvency, providing an improved measure of that probability without imposing further distributional assumptions. The traditional measure of the probability of insolvency thus provides a less e¤ective upper bound of the probability of insolvency, [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] but can in fact be meaningfully reinterpreted as a measure capturing the odds of insolvency instead. We obtain analogous re…ned probabilistic interpretations of the commonly used simple and log-transformed Z-score measures. In particular, the log of the Z-score is shown to be negatively proportional to the log odds of insolvency, and thus meaningfully de…ned on the domain of all real numbers. As a consequence, it emerges from our re…nement as an attractive and unproblematic insolvency risk measure to use (even as a dependent variable in standard regression analysis), giving now more rigorously founded support to its emerging use in the literature. 
B. ROE-based Z-score
An alternative, return-on-equity based Z-score measure was …rst proposed in Goyeau and Tarazi (1992) (in the special context of normal return distributions); we can provide a similarly re…ned probabilistic interpretation for such a measure that allows for non-normal return distributions, analogously to the discussion of the more commonly used ROA-based measure in the main text.
In line with our approach in Section 2, we can equivalently de…ne bank insolvency as a state where roe 1, with roe the bank's return on equity; this allow us to then state Proposition 2. If roe is a random variable with …nite mean roe and variance 2 roe , an upper bound of the bank's probability of insolvency p is given by p(roe 1) 1 1 + Z 2 e < 1
where the (alternative) Z-score Z e is de…ned as Z e 1+ roe roe > 0.
Proof. This is analogous to the proof of Proposition 1, setting X = roe and a = 1 + roe and dividing both numerator and denominator of the right hand side of the inequality by It is straightforward to see that this alternative ROE-based Z-score measure behaves and can be utilized analogously to the more commonly used ROA-based measure discussed in the main text; for conciseness, we only state the most practically relevant corollary to Proposition 2 as
